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Mathematical proofs in practice: Revisiting the
reliability of published mathematical proofs
Abstract
Mathematics seems to have a special status when compared to other
areas of human knowledge. This special status is linked with the role
of proof. Mathematicians often believe that this type of argumentation
leaves no room for errors and unclarity. Philosophers of mathematics
have differentiated between absolutist and fallibilist views on mathemat-
ical knowledge, and argued that these views are related to whether one
looks at mathematics-in-the-making or finished mathematics. In this pa-
per we take a closer look at mathematical practice, more precisely at the
publication process in mathematics. We argue that the apparent view
that mathematical literature, given the special status of mathematics, is
highly reliable is too naive. We will discuss several problems in the pub-
lication process that threaten this view, and give several suggestions on
how this could be countered.
Keywords: Mathematical proof, Reliability, Publication process, Abso-
lutism, Fallibilism
1 Introduction
In recent decades a growing number of philosophers of mathematics have relo-
cated their attention from the logical foundations of mathematics to the practice
of mathematics1. In this paper we proceed along these lines by critically reeval-
uating the reliability of the publishing process in mathematics.
In section 2 we will discuss how mathematics is often characterized as epis-
temically unique, and relate this view with absolutist and fallibilist approaches
to mathematics. Our goal is to show that the argument that the view that
mathematics is epistemically unique does not necessarily lead to a high level of
reliability of publications in mathematical literature. We will argue in section
3 why this is the case. Section 4 discusses possible strategies to counter the
problematic situation that we outlined in section 3. Section 5, finally, entails
some concluding remarks.
1See, for instance, the work of Mancosu (2008) and the recently founded Association for the
Philosophy of Mathematical Practice or APMP (http://institucional.us.es/apmp/index.htm).
For more insights on the historical development of the study of mathematical practice and its
relationship with traditional philosophy of mathematics, see Van Bendegem (2014).
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2 Mathematical knowledge
2.1 Epistemic uniqueness
Mathematical knowledge is often characterized as very special and unique, since
it seems that mathematical knowledge has a level of certainty, exactness and
objectivity that is unachieved in any other form of knowledge, including scientific
knowledge. Mathematicians defend such a view with confidence. Kline argues
as follows: “Whenever someone wants an example of certitude and exactness of
reasoning, he appeals to mathematics.” (Kline, 1980, p. 4) Krantz also describes
the idea that mathematics “is equipped with a sort of certainty that other
sciences do not possess. [. . . ] We have endowed the system with a reliability
and reproducibility and portability that no other science can hope for.” (Krantz,
2011, p. 22)
Philosophers have wondered about the special epistemic status of mathemat-
ics as well. Heintz (2000) refers to two typical characteristics of mathematics,
i.e. coherence of mathematical concepts and theories and the consensus among
mathematicians. First, mathematics is strongly connected and coherent. What
mathematicians and scientists have in common is that they work relatively iso-
lated and within small specialized subfields. In contrast with science, where
this practice leads to partly contradictory theories, mathematics remains highly
coherent. Second, Heintz refers to a high consensus among mathematicians, or,
as she indicates, mathematics does not allow flexibility on the part of interpre-
tation. More specifically, mathematics leaves no room for controversy in regard
to its conclusions. Anyone accepting the rules of the mathematical method is
thus supposed to arrive at the same result.
2.2 Absolutism and fallibilism in mathematics
Several philosophers have nonetheless pointed out that the above view of math-
ematics is mistaken, since it it is not a correct or complete presentation of the
mathematical practice or mathematical knowledge. Ernest (1998) describes two
opposing views in philosophy of mathematics, that is the absolutist and the
fallibilist view about mathematical knowledge. Absolutism sees mathematical
knowledge as a body of knowledge consisting of certain and unchallengeable
truths. Sympathisers of the absolutist view argue that the use of formal lan-
guage, axioms and strict rules of inference in mathematics leads to unquestion-
able mathematical knowledge. Furthermore, they argue that these tools suffice
to establish all mathematical truths.
The other view Ernest describes, and argues for, is fallibilism. This is a more
recent position in the philosophy of mathematics, and embraces the practice of
mathematics and its human side. Mathematical knowledge is here described
as fallible and corrigible, both in terms of its proofs and its concepts. Lakatos
(1978) is often considered among the first and most important authors that pre-
sented such a fallibilistic view. In Proofs and Refutations, he presents a lively
classroom discussion of Euler’s formula in order to explore ideas about the con-
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cept of proof and the nature of mathematics. By showing how the formula
was investigated, decomposed, built upon and improved, Lakatos presented a
mathematical activity that was an alternative to the idea that mathematics
was merely presenting an absolute proof. Through his analogy, Lakatos demon-
strated mathematics as an activity of trial and error. Mathematical concepts,
forms and standards of proof are not permanently fixed, but can rather have a
history of continuous modification.
One way of approaching these discussions is by differentiating between writ-
ing mathematics and doing mathematics. Hersh (1997) has called this respec-
tively the ‘front’ and the ‘back’ of mathematics. The analogy is made by refer-
ring to a gourmet restaurant, where in the front the public are served finished
and perfect dishes. The back, which is the kitchen, is restricted to insiders and
shows a much more messy (but often pratical) activity. Hersh argues that in
mathematics an analogous distinction between the front, how mathematics is
presented neatly in lectures and textbooks, and the back, how mathematicians
‘make’ new knowledge and how this is connected with a messy human striving.
The front still leaves the impression of an absolutist view of mathematics while
the back shows a more fallibilist picture.
2.3 Mathematical publications
The dichotomy between absolutism and fallibilism has mainly led to extensive
discussions in the philosophy of mathematical education, on how mathematics
should be presented in the classroom. Within the community of working mathe-
maticians, however, such discussions are quite rare 2. In this paper, we examine
a particular part of the mathematical practice, namely the publication process.
It is not surprising that, in accordance with the work of Hersh, there are differ-
ences between the activities that are part of creating a mathematical idea and
the properties of the final paper. We are interested in the latter, and whether
one could still uphold the idea that knowledge presented in mathematical liter-
ature reaches an uniquely high level of reliability or the knowledge presented in
papers is in fact part of the fallible striving towards true knowledge.
Mathematicians do not merely present the claims or conclusions of their re-
search in published articles. They use the method of proof, in order to show how
the truth of these claims is mathematically established. A crucial aspect of proof
seems to be that, if two or more mathematicians share the same mathemati-
cal assumptions and reasoning methods, one can check a proof of his colleague
completely in order to verify the correctness of the mathematical result.
Obviously, working mathematicians are humans and are not immune to er-
ror. This is the case even if mathematics offers this method that, in principle,
leaves no room for errors. Mathematical research is complex. There is always a
possibility that mathematicians make a mistake that they oversee themselves.
Consequently, if a mathematician presents a mathematical result, it is possible
his or her research is infected by mistakes.
2The gap between concepts in (philosophy of) mathematical education and mathematical
practice is discussed by Sfard (1998)
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The most common and important medium mathematicians use in order to
present these results, in agreement with other sciences, is the publication in
academic journals. This sort of communication has two specific characteristics.
First, these journals are peer reviewed. As a result, every paper is reviewed by
at least one mathematician before it is accepted for publication. Secondly, after
the publication anyone with access to the journal can read the article.
Starting from these assumptions one would be able to argue that the math-
ematical literature is highly reliable. If an article contains an error, due to a
mistake of the author, this error can be detected by the reviewers of the journal.
Even if these reviewers do not detect the error, other mathematicians will be
able to detect it. This is the case even when a mistake eludes detection for a
long period, which is a characteristic that makes mathematics unique, as dis-
cussed by Azzouni: “[E]ven if many results are built on that mistake, this wont
provide enough social inertia once the error is unearthed to resist changing the
practice back to what it was originally: in mathematics, even after lots of time,
the subsequent mathematics built on the falsehood is repudiated.” (Azzouni,
2007, p.9)
In the following section we argue that in contemporary practice, this argu-
ment is too naive. Although we believe that these assumptions have a certain
truth in them, the reality is more complex and problematic.We will argue that
the reliability of mathematical literature should be handled with greater caution
than is done in contemporary practice. The result is that if we want to deal with
this problem, as we will do in the final section by suggesting several strategies,
that mathematical literature should be more located in the back and treated in
terms of the fallibilist.
3 Mathematical Practice
3.1 Surveyability of mathematical proofs
A first important observation is that mathematicians, in contrast with other
sciences, are able to prove their results. Once such a proof is available, another
mathematician can in principle check the correctness of the proof without any
doubt, by making sure that every part of the proof follows legitimately from
the previous ones. The question that evidently arises is whether every proof
can be checked this rigorously. These questions are linked with the topic of
surveyability, that has been severely discussed in mathematics and philosophy
3.
Contemporary discussions on the surveyability of mathematical proofs start
with the seminal paper on the four-color theorem by Tymoczko (1979). The
problem is that the proof, provided by Appel and Haken, is obtained with
the use of computer programs. The data used is too immense in order to be
checked by a mathematician. Tymockzo argued that if we accept the four-color
theorem based on a computer-assisted proof we have to change the concept
3For a historical overview, see (Bassler, 2006)
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of proof. The standard view of proof was indeed a “construction that can be
looked over, reviewed, verified by a rational agent. We often say that a proof
must be perspicuous, or capable of being checked by hand. It is an exhibition, a
derivation of the conclusion, and it needs nothing outside itself to be convincing.
The mathematician surveys the proof in its entirety and thereby comes to know
the conclusion.”(Tymoczko, 1979, p. 59) Tymoczko thus showed, that the fact
that most of the mathematical community did accept the proof as a genuine
mathematical justification for the four-color theorem, meant a crucial change in
traditional conceptions of proof and mathematical knowledge.
Contemporary mathematics is increasingly reliant on the interaction with
computer systems, and not only for reasoning or calculation steps in proofs.
There are also more and more programs that verify mathematical results.4 In
order to use these tools, the proof must be written in a completely formal lan-
guage, which is a precise artificial language that only admits certain well-defined
operations. Naturally, the proof-checking software could contain bugs and again,
mathematicians are not always able to check everything themselves because the
processed data is too immense. There is however another problem, namely that
the proofs mathematicians deal with are almost never spelled out in a complete
formal language: “Human mathematics consists in fact in talking about formal
proofs, and not actually performing them. One argues quite convincingly that
certain formal texts exist, and it would in fact not be impossible to write them
down. But it is not done: it would be hard work and useless because the human
brain is not good at checking that a formal text is error-free. Human math-
ematics is a sort of dance around an unwritten formal text, which if written
would be unreadable.” (Ruelle, 2000, p. 254)
Hence, for a set of (non-traditional) proofs the certainty of the established
theorem is not obtained by referring to the surveyability of its proof. But at least
most mathematicians are willing to discuss what place they give these theorems
in the body of mathematical knowledge. More interesting and more problematic
are the traditional proofs. Perhaps a move towards proof-checking programs
is needed, but we are in this paper interested in the proofs that are in fact
published. And these proofs are not presented in a way that the surveyability
and verifiability is trivial5.
Fallis (2003), for instance, introduces the notion of gaps in mathematical
proofs 6. A gap is any point where the written proof does not follow from the
previous lines in the proof by merely applying formally valid rules of inference.
Fallis argues that most actual proofs that are presented by the mathematical
community contain gaps. He proposes the following categorization of proof
gaps: A mathematician leaves an inferential gap whenever the mathematician
4For further discussions of this topic, see (Harrison, 2008).
5It could be that certain informal mathematical methods, such as mathematical visualiza-
tions, are tools to verify mathematical results as well. Giaquinto (2007), for example, argues
that mathematical visualisations can lead to legitimate mathematical knowledge. Further
investigations in these topics are more than welcome.
6Fallis introduces this notion in order to argue that probabilistic proofs in mathematics
should be given more credence.
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uses a particular sequence of propositions, which he/she has in mind as being
a proof, that is in fact not a proof. This sort of gap is problematic, as it un-
dercuts the proof. A mathematician leaves an enthymematic gap if he/she does
not explicitly state the particular sequence of propositions in mind. One has
supposedly checked all the details, but these details are left out for the sake of
style or length of the article. The third category are untraversed gaps, where
the mathematician has not tried to verify directly that each proposition in the
sequence of propositions that he/she has in mind follows from a subset of pre-
vious propositions in the sequence by application of a mathematical inference.
Fallis notes that in some cases it is “considered acceptable for a mathematician
to leave an untraversed gap.” (Fallis, 2003, p. 59) Next to this taxonomy of
gaps, Fallis speaks of a universally untraversed gap if none of the members of
the mathematical community has bridged an untraversed gap. He claims that
such gaps are not unusual in mathematical practice and that proofs containing
such gaps are still often accepted/justified by the mathematical community 7.
A similar point, using another terminology, is also made by Davis (1972),
who discusses the practice of splicing proofs: “In the course of a proof, one
cites Euler’s Theorem, say, by way of authority. The onus is now on the reader
to verify that all the conditions (in their most modern formulation) which are
necessary for the applicability of the theorem are, in fact, present.” (Davis, 1972,
p. 259) Splicing allows mathematicians to leave out steps that are sufficiently
worked out in other places of the literature. Davis argues that splicing is not
the only phenomenon in mathematical practice. Mathematicians also skip steps.
The practice of skipping is very similar to the taxonomy of gaps provided by
Fallis. Davis states that mathematicians skip steps due to boredom, if he or she
finds it unnecessary to complete every single step, or superiority, if he or she
believes that everyone can follow the steps without spelling them out.
Mathematicians thus leave, in practice, gaps in the communication of math-
ematical proofs. On the one hand this makes the proofs more readable, on
the other hand it is not always clear to what extent the proofs can still be
checked rigourously. Coleman (2009), discussing the surveyability of long proofs
in mathematics, concludes that a dichotomy between short and long proofs is
unnecessary since mathematics always concerns long proofs, emphasizing the
importance of the archive of mathematical literature in this matter:“The key to
that, is to recognise that mathematics is a written practice which depends on
the accumulation and deployment of an archive. Because of that, one does not
need to have all of a proof in ones head because it is all on record. Understand-
ing it means you have the main idea of it in your head, and knowing it requires
both that, and the facility with the archive to get at the details if wanted. The
fully written out proofs are there, in a sense - the distributed sense in which
the mathematically educated agent can access them, and so the theorems of
mathematics are indeed justified by proofs, though the true justifications are
7Fallis admits that it is difficult to cite cases where it is undeniable that a mathematician
has left a universally untraversed gap and that he/she is nevertheless justified in his/her belief
in a a manner that is accepted by the mathematical community. Fallis discusses several cases
that suggest that leaving universally untraversed gaps is at least sometimes accepted.
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not the proofs labeled as such. Really, mathematics is long proofs.” (Coleman,
2009, p. 42)
We believe that this is a good view of mathematical research, but we want to
include two remarks. First, not all “fully written out proofs” are available, since
published proofs are not only sliced, but certain steps are also skipped. And
secondly, it shows that checking a mathematical proof comes with a high price. If
one wants to fully check a mathematical result, one has to consult the archives
of mathematical literature and fill in certain gaps in addition to reading the
paper itself. The idea that mathematical proofs can be checked beyond doubt
given common assumptions and methods between mathematicians, is thus not
as simple as it appears. Moreover, as we will discuss in the next sections, proofs
are not sufficiently checked at all.
3.2 Peer review
Once a paper containing mathematical results is written, it is submitted to an
academic journal. Before it can be published, the article must be reviewed by
referees. These referees, other professional mathematicians who are experts in
the area covered in the article, decide whether the article can be published in
the journal. One of the goals of the peer review system is quality control. It
protects the body of literature from contamination by false or flawed arguments.
Does the refereeing process lead to a high reliability of mathematical liter-
ature? Although we have seen that this is also problematic, the use of (semi-
)verifiable proofs could still lead to a positive answer. Nathanson, in an opinion
piece for a mathematical journal is however quite pessimistic on this: How do
we know that a proof is correct? By checking it, line by line. [. . . ] If a theorem
has a short complete proof, we can check it. But if the proof is deep, difficult,
and already fills 100 journal pages, if no one has the time and energy to fill in
the details, if a complete proof would be 100,000 pages long, then we rely on the
judgment of the bosses in the field. [. . . ] Many (I think most) papers in most
refereed journals are not refereed. There is a presumptive referee who looks at
the paper, reads the introduction and the statement of the results, glances at
the proofs, and, if everything seems okay, recommends publication. Some refer-
ees check proofs line-by-line, but many do not. When I read a journal article,
I often find mistakes. Whether I can fix them is irrelevant. The literature is
unreliable.” (Nathanson, 2008, p. 773)
Nathanson mentions several problems. First, mathematicians are not able
to check all the proofs themselves. We will discuss this problem more severe in
the next section. Second, referees do not check the correctness of the proofs.
Hildebrand (2009) also states that reviewers can only be reasonably confident
about the correctness of the article. It remains however vague what this amounts
to and whether this happens in practice. And third, Nathanson (2008) was able
to find mistakes in the literature. Nathanson does not stand alone with his
claim that the literature contains error. Davis (1972) states that half of the
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published proofs contain errors 8.
Geist, Lo¨we and Van Kerkhove (2010) have done preliminary research on the
status of the refereeing process and the link with the reliability of mathematical
literature. They remarkably found that it is not even universally expected that
referees check the complete correctness of the paper: “Mathematicians disagree
about the amount of detail checking that has to be done by the referees. While
some (few) mathematicians think that checking the correctness of the proofs is
the main task of the referee, others disagree with this and consider mathematical
correctness the problem of the author rather than that of the referee.” (Geist
et al., 2010, p. 161) This is confirmed by a questionnaire the authors sent
off to several mathematical journals. One of the questions was whether the
referee should check all the proofs in detail, some proofs in detail or no proofs in
detail. Of the 27 editors that were addressed, 11 answered: the first option was
chosen five times, the second six times, and the third option was not selected.
Remarkably, one of the editors who chose the first option added: “but to be
reasonable, I am happy when I find a referee doing (b)”(Geist et al., 2010, pp.
163-164)), which is in fact the second option.
3.3 Mathematical community
Mathematicians, as mentioned above, base their work on the archive of other
mathematical results. Consequently, it can still be the case that mathematical
publications are sufficiently checked when they are used for new research. How-
ever, this view is still quite naive, as already became clear in the quote from
Nathanson in the previous section. Mathematicians do not have the time or
expertise to completely check every proof they read or use. Rather, Geist, Lo¨we
and Van Kerkhove (2010) state there is a tendency of mathematicians to take
proofs for granted in using them for their own research.
The fact that knowledge depends on the knowledge reported by others is
discussed in the topic of testimony9. It is evident that a great number of our
beliefs come from what others tell us. The epistemology of testimony takes up
the challenge to investigate when and why these beliefs are justified.
Hardwig (1985)(1991) acknowledges trust as an ultimate foundation for a
serious part of our knowledge10. He argues that this trust is eligible since “if I
were to pursue epistemic autonomy across the board, I would succeed in hold-
ing relatively uninformed, unreliable, crude, untested and therefore irrational
beliefs.” (Hardwig, 1985, p. 340) Mathematical progress would indeed be hard
8There is naturally a difference between errors that undermine the established theorems,
and errors that are present in the paper but don’t render the results false. There is no reason
to believe that the majority of mathematical results in the literature is false because there are
quite a lot of errors. This could be linked with Thurston’s (1994) claim that mathematicians
are manifest better in detecting flaws or weaknesses that make a proof false than validating
its complete formal correctness.
9For a detailed overview of both historical and contemporary positions in this debate, see
(Origgi, 2004).
10For insights on how its counterparts, being distrust and mistrust, influence knowledge
gaining, see (Primiero and Kosolosky, 2014)
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without relying on testimony of others. It would, for instance, require a lot of
time and expertise for a mathematician to check the reliability of each accepted
proposition in a proof. Moreover, the proofs that the mathematician would
be able to check, start themselves from already accepted propositions. Despite
the fact that testimony seems to be an essential part of mathematical research
and progress, we should still ask ourselves when relying on testimony is in fact
justified. Or, in other words, when we are justified taking the work and word
of our peers for granted in a rather ‘blind’ manner, as we miss out on time and
energy to justify their claims for ourselves.
The mathematician Auslander refers to the importance of experts in this
matter. Mathematicians take certain results for granted, without verifying the
proofs themselves: “We accept that a purported result is correct when we hear
that it has been proved by a mathematician we trust and “validated” by experts
in the authors mathematical specialty. This is the case even if we havent read
the proof, or more frequently when we dont have the background to follow the
proof.”(Auslander, 2008, p. 64)
Furthermore, many mathematicians adopt the view that if a mathematical
result is published in a journal, it must be trustworthy. Weber (2008) (2011)
interviewed several mathematics professors at a regional university in the United
States, specialized in a variety of mathematical disciplines. On the topic of
validating the correctness of the proofs, one of the interviewees said: “To be
honest, when I read papers, I don’t read the proofs. In the journal papers, and
the papers that I read in my research, maybe that’s bad or maybe that’s not, if
I’m convinced that the result is true, I don’t necessarily need to read it, I can just
believe it.” (Weber, 2008, p. 449) Another professor said the following: “I do
not try and determine if a proof is correct. If it is in a journal, I assume it is. I’m
much more interested in the ideas of a proof.” (Weber and Mejia-Ramos, 2011,
p. 334) It must be noted that it is not the case that all participants indicate that
they do not check proofs in the literature. In fact, some indicate that they do
pay attention to the correctness of proofs when they read papers. Nevertheless,
these quotations show that Nathanson and Auslander are not mistaken when
indicating that checking the correctness of a proof is not the primary concern of
mathematicians. And we already discussed the problem of depending on peer
review for the correctness of these proofs.
Another observation connected with the problem of testimony is the fact
that, which may seem surprising for an outstander11, some mathematical re-
sults in fact lack a written proof. This is, among others, described by the
mathematician Thurston: “Within any field, there are certain theorems and
certain techniques that are generally known and generally accepted. When you
write a paper, you refer to these without proof. You look at other papers in
the field, and you see what facts they quote without proof, and what they cite
in their bibliography. [. . . ] Many of the things that are generally known are
things for which there may be no known written source. As long as people in
11Mathematicians themselves even have a name for proofs that may circulate without having
been appeared in print, namely mathematical folklore.
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the field are comfortable that the idea works, it doesn’t need to have a formal
written source.” (Thurston, 1994, p. 168)
The attitude of taking other literature for granted does not only stand in
the way of detecting and correcting errors in the literature. In reality, it leads
to new results that are based on flawed literature. Consequently, it becomes
increasingly complex to correct mistakes in the literature, since new results are
based on other results that are potentially flawed and potentially insufficiently
checked by either reviewers or authors of the new article.
3.4 Mathematical journals
A final issue is that authors are in fact not always interested in validating
other results, and more interested in finding new results. In science, authors
may be inclined to publish statistically significant results more eagerly than
non-significant ones, and negative findings are more difficult to prove with a
high probability than positive ones (Resnik, 2007). Moreover, results that are
more provocative may get published more easily, as a study on precognition
demonstrates: Bem (2011) published an article in which he reported evidence
of peoples ability to see the future. Ritchie, French and Wiseman (2012), who
replicated the study, found, however, no evidence of precognition. Their paper
was however rejected by the same journal as Bem’s research was published
in. The journal mentioned that their policy was not to publish replications of
previous studies. The replication study was also turned down by Science, only
now the reason was that the negative results should be published in the same
journal as the original study, which the authors previously attempted to do.
Psychological Science and Science Brevia is yet another journal that rejected the
study without conducting proper peer review (Goldacre, 2011)(Sutton, 2011).
Our example shows how difficult it is to get negative studies published. Science is
thought to be self-correcting partly because there is the possibility of replicating
previous studies. However, while researchers are pressured to publish frequently
as to promote their career, the editors policy of not publishing replication studies
does not encourage them to take part in the process of correcting each others
work. This, in turn, can hinder the detection of biases and mistakes in earlier
studies (Jukola, Forthcoming).
Grcar (2013) has discussed the fact that, compared to other areas of inves-
tigation, mathematical literature has significantly lower correction rates. How-
ever, considering the previous sections, it is hard to maintain that mathematical
literature has in fact lower error rates than these other areas of investigation.
One possible explanation is that mathematicians are in fact absolutists that
believe that papers that undergo peer review are free from error. This point
has been discussed earlier. Another explanation that Grcar points out is a lack
of editorial guidance: “The lack of editorial policies inviting correction goes
hand in hand with low rates in mathematical journals. [. . . ] Some journals
privately advise authors to post corrections on their personal websites, which
is not consistent with the concept of an archival literature.” (Grcar, 2013, p.
422) The idea that mathematical research is based on the archive of literature
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indeed demands that errors in the archive are not only detected, but that these
errors are also indicated and/or corrected in the archives themselves. This is
not the case, because similarly to the discussed case in psychology, journals are
not eager to publish such results.
An example of this problem is an online article of Capelas de Oliveira and
Rodrigues Jr (2006). They provide a comment on a published paper on compu-
tations in multi-dimensional mathematics. The authors of the comment provide
a severe criticism and several counterexamples to what they take to be unbeliev-
able results of the published paper. However, this valid comment has not been
published, while the concerning paper is not retracted and still available in the
archival literature. A second example is a letter from Hill(2010), who also found
a sufficient amount of counterexamples to a published mathematical paper. In a
letter to the journal he complains about the reluctance of publishing his remarks
fully, and the problematic effects of the fact that the paper is not retracted or
corrected sufficiently: “The Editorial solution was a “correction” that not only
omitted many of the flaws I had found, but also introduced a new mathematical
error into the permanent record in spite of an additional counterexample I had
provided them to the new claim. The same errors that appeared in the 2006
Notices article continue to be propagated in the literature, including published
research articles and a new book. More than two years later, I am still trying
to publish the counterexamples, and will continue to do so.” (Hill, 2010, p. 7)
4 Discussion
It is not our goal to argue that relying on testimony, or, in other words, ‘blindly’
trusting one’s peers, in mathematical practice should be prohibited, since it
would make mathematical research and progress impossible. However, the idea
of working mathematicians that published articles are free from error creates
an absurdly high expectation of peer review to catch all errors. We will argue
in this section for more transparency and a fair credit allocation, in order to
encourage mathematicians to detect, acknowledge and discuss mistakes in the
literature.
4.1 Plea for transparency
Increasing the level of transparency breaks the taboo that mathematical knowl-
edge in the literature is as infallible as an absolutist view suggests.
A first way to achieve more transparency is using the possibilities and po-
tential of the internet fully. Several sciences already began to adapt to the ‘new’
medium by building and using online databases that were designed in order to
share data among a community of scientists. An example is the Gene Expres-
sion Omnibus12. As an answer to the demand for a public repository for data
generated from high-throughput microarray experiments, this database allows
scientists to submit, store, retrieve and consult many types of data sets.
12Which can be found online on: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/geo/
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There are also examples from the field of mathematics. A first case is the
Metamath Proof Explorer13. Inspired by Whitehead and Russel’s project Prin-
cipia Mathematica, the aim of this database is to collect completely worked out
proofs, starting from the very basic foundations of mathematics. As a result,
each proof can be brought back to the axioms of logic and set theory. Many
mathematicians would argue that the phenomena of slicing, splicing and gaps
discussed earlier in this paper are in fact tools in order to avoid such proofs
that demand lots of patience for even quite simple or basic proofs. But one can
hardly say that such projects are not welcome in mathematical practice, where
the complete correctness of mathematical literature is unattained. A second case
is the Polymath and Tricki Project, two projects initiated in 2009 by mathe-
matician and Fields Medallist winner Gowers. In January 2009 Gowers posted a
unsolved mathematical problem on his blog and invited collaboration from any-
one who was interested. About 40 people accepted the challenge and together
they solved the problem within several weeks. This pace was highly uncommon
for such a problematic case. The resulting proofs were eventually published un-
der the pseudonym Polymath. Next to the Polymath project, Gowers launched
Tricki14, which is a Wikipedia-style database of articles about mathematical
techniques that are useful in mathematical problem solving.
We argue for more and specific databases that increase the transparency on
how a fully written out proof could be completed. Given the length of some
proofs, and the archive of proofs of assumptions of the new proof, it is indeed
impossible and unnecessary to include every step in the literature. If such an
omission is the case, for any reason whatsoever, an online database could serve
as an archive for the steps that the author of the article has in fact completed.
An online database could serve as a substitute. If there are steps that (s)he
does not complete because it is too trivial, the author should mention this. If
(s)he leaves out steps because they are in the literature (either in work of the
author self, or in other work), (s)he should include references to these proofs.
And finally, if (s)he leaves out steps because (s)he has done them, but are left
out in function of the length, comprehensibility or style of the article, (s)he
should put them in the database. We hope the benefits of such a database are
clear. If a mathematician has in fact gone through some steps, in a formal or
informal way, it is very little effort to put them in the database. Consequently,
it is more transparent, in case of doubt, to check steps or fill in gaps of the proof.
The success of Gowers’ Polymath shows a goodwill among mathematicians to
tackle mathematical problems collaboratively. As we have argued throughout
the paper, the correctness of publications should be seen as a challenge as well.
Not only authors should be more transparent, but peer reviewers as well.
Again, we will not argue that the responsibility of the correctness of the proofs
lays fully with the peer reviewers. Such a view is unattainable, since we agree
that reviewers can in fact only be reasonably certain about the correctness of
the proof. However, we do defend the obligation of the peer reviewers to be
13Which can be found online on: http://us.metamath.org/mpegif/mmset.html
14Which can be found online on: www.tricki.org
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transparent about their contribution to checking the correctness of proofs. If a
peer reviewer checks certain steps, while (s)he is not able to fully check another
part of the proof, for example due to his/her area of expertise, this can and
should be public information. Such information is useful and in fact crucial for
other mathematicians, whether they are other reviewers, editors or readers.
4.2 Credit allocation
Looking into how scientific research is socially organized has often led to the
characterization of a researcher as a credit-maximizing individual. Research is
driven rather by the search for credits than a search for truth. Researchers
can for example gain credits by publishing results in respected journals. Con-
sequently, such credits lead to new funding or job opportunities, which can be
again formulated in terms of credit. The notion of credit has been used in phi-
losophy of science, for example in order to explain how scientists choose certain
research programs (Kitcher, 1993). Naturally, mathematicians are also inter-
ested in their academic positions and career, and mathematical practice can
also be considered as a credit-driven practice.
The idea of credit-driven mathematics allows us to formulate several strate-
gies that would lead to a situation where mathematicians can earn credit for
checking proofs. This is now not the case, as refereeing is done anonymously. If
referees are no longer anonymous, it would be possible to grant them credits for
checking the correctness of proofs. It is hard to see why a referee that checks
the correctness of proofs should be anonymous. Judgment on originality and
publication worthiness of a paper can be another case, but perhaps these tasks
should then be separated in the refereeing process.
It is also necessary to endorse an editor mentality shift concerning corrections
of published papers. If such papers become more acceptable in the literature,
mathematicians will be more inclined to take the time to check or complete other
proofs. Now, as we have seen, such endeavors end up in internet databases or
letters to journals, which leave the authors with no credits. Another possibility
is that we devise a mathematical journal that solely focuses on contributions
concerning the correctness of (already published) proofs. It is easy to see that
for an innovative or highly difficult result in mathematical research the mathe-
matician in question deserves credit. But the previous sections have shown that
contributing results about a flaw or weakness of a proof, filling in gaps of a proof
or asserting the correctness of a long or difficult proof are also important.
Mathematicians should earn credit for these endeavors as well. The possibil-
ity of gaining academic credit for checking proofs, encourages mathematicians
to invest time in such tasks. In fact, it seems that in the current situations
credits are what pushes them away from performing such tasks where no credit
can be gained. Furthermore, more transparency, as discussed earlier, should
also encourage mathematicians to take up these tasks. This is a scenario that
could easily lead to an increased degree of reliability concerning the proofs and
results established in mathematical literature .
Finally, our approach creates room to implicate the importance of a new,
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what Shirky (2008) calls a “publish-then-filter”, approach to mathematical prac-
tice. Publish-then-filter, in our case, entails that mathematical journals publish
proofs15 knowing that they might turn out to be false later on16, as opposed
to postponing publication as long as one is not entirely sure about the relia-
bility of its content. This idea could function in mathematical research as it
already does in other scientific research. In academia ones claims get rejected
all the time turning rejection into an intrinsic and accepted part of scientific
research. Papers are but rarely withdrawn from previous publication, even if
they contain evident mistakes. The reasoning behind it is that these mistakes
are thought to be eventually filtered out through subsequent publications or
meta-analyses or, as we suggested, through journals focusing solely on correct-
ing flaws in previous papers. Not only is this approach closer to how scientific
practice works, it would also take a considerable load off of reviewers worries.
They should check the papers to a reasonable level, being transparent about
what they have checked completely and what not. After publication, other
mathematicians should than challenge the results further. This, however, can
only work if mathematicians and the broader audience adjust their attitude to-
wards mathematics (and knowledge-gaining in general), i.e. that results can be
flawed and that this is part of the game.
What our scientific endeavors will bring us, we cannot predict. What we can
predict, however, is that sticking to a rigid view on the epistemic uniqueness
of mathematics, in terms of it possessing old-fashioned certainty, will certainly
not be conducive. In this paper we made an attempt to adjust this view of
mathematics and proposed strategies to tackle the problems that surround it.
The alternative we propose is much more in line with fallibilism of mathematics,
where processes from the back-checking, completing, changing, correcting,...-
proofs are much more highlighted in the presentation of mathematical results.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we started with the differentiation between absolutist and falli-
bilist views on mathematical knowledge, and the argument that the view that
mathematical knowledge is infallible is only defendable when one looks at the
front of mathematics, as it is presented in lectures and books, and not when one
looks at the back of mathematics, as how working mathematicians deal with
problems in practice.
Starting from the assumptions that mathematicians are in fact humans and
are not immune to error, one can still argue that the method of proof and
communication through academic journals leads to a high level of reliability of
mathematical publications. If an article contains an error, due to a mistake of
15Of course, we imagine this in accordance to our other suggestions made above.
16According to Shirky, its opposing strategy filter-then-publish is outdated, as “[it] rested
on a scarcity of media that is a thing of the past. The expansion of social media means that
the only working system is publish-then-filter.” (Shirky, 2008, p. 98) For an impression how
this idea would impact other disciplines, see (Kosolosky, Forthcoming).
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the author, this error can be detected by the reviewers of the journal. Even
if these reviewers do not detect the error, other mathematicians will be able
to detect it. This is the case even when a mistake eludes detection for a long
period.
However, we showed that, first of all, published proofs contain gaps and
cannot simply be checked by humans. Secondly, at each level of the publication
process, we argued that there is a general lack of discipline to emphasize the
importance of checking and correcting published proofs. Given this state of the
field, we came up with several ways in which mathematics, as a discipline, can
and should be improved, so that it becomes more responsive to actual math-
ematical practice. These are (1) ways that increase the transparency among
authors and reviewers, for instance through appealing to online databases, (2)
ways that allow for appropriate credit allocation, both for authors (in the sense
that venues are created for checking and correcting proofs) as for reviewers (in
the sense that they get awarded for their work in checking proofs by making
their names explicit) in a practice responsive system of publish-then-filter.
Working out these particular suggestions would require further research that
goes beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless we managed to show that
such ideas governed by transparency and credit allocation could help us to bring
mathematical publications and mathematical practice closer together. At this
point, we hope to have established some important questions for both philosophy
of mathematics and the practice of mathematics.
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